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Abstract: The regulation of payday loans holds the potential of extending 
the benefits of regulating overindebtness, currently provided via 
bankruptcy legislation to the middle-class, to lower income debtors.  This 
potential needs to be balanced against lower income debtors’ need for 
credit and the corresponding benefits resulting from access to credit 
provided by alternative credit markets, such as the payday lending market. 
Unlike the United States, where payday lenders have more locations than 
Starbucks and McDonalds combined, and payday lending regulation is up 
there with Vampire Weekend and the Tipping Point as an attention 
grabbing pop-culture reference, payday lending is relatively new, 
underdeveloped and unregulated in Canada.  Over the last year, in the 
wake of a recent amendment to the Canadian Criminal Code, that would 
see payday lenders exempted from the 60 per cent criminal rate of interest 
in provinces where payday lenders are provincially regulated, Canadian 
provinces have began to regulate and put forth regulatory proposals for a 
previously unregulated area.  This exercise has been attempted in the 
context of limited recent domestic analysis of the payday lending industry, 
borrowers and regulatory options.  Accordingly, this article sets out to fill 
this void.  The article draws on the American experience with payday 
lending and payday lending regulation, and also a first-hand experience of 
attempting to obtain a payday loan in Toronto, Ontario, to evaluate the 
current provincial reform efforts. 
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REGULATING PAYDAY LENDERS IN CANADA: 
DRAWING ON AMERICAN LESSONS 
 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai* 
 
Payday loans are a relatively new phenomenon in Canada.  They are 
typically short-term, single-payment loans: the lender agrees to lend the 
debtor a certain amount of money, in return for the promise of repayment 
(usually on a cheque from the debtor, post-dated to the date of his or her 
next paycheque) and certain fees.  Payday lending has been vilified in 
recent media coverage of subprime or fringe lending.  Often payday 
lending is described as “predatory.”  Three key arguments are made in 
support of the “predatory” label:  payday lenders charge too much money; 
payday lenders target the poor; and payday lenders lie to customers (or 
omit information).  At the same time, payday lending, like other forms of 
fringe lending in the past, plays a role in servicing and giving access to 
credit to an otherwise neglected segment of the market:  minority and 
disenfranchised groups. 
In the wake of a recent amendment to the federal Criminal Code that 
would see payday lenders exempted from the 60 per cent criminal rate of 
interest in provinces where payday lenders are provincially regulated, 
Canadian provinces have begun to regulate and put forth regulatory 
proposals for a previously unregulated area.  This exercise has been 
attempted in the context of limited recent domestic analysis of the payday 
lending industry, borrowers and regulatory options.  Accordingly, this 
article sets out to fill this void by drawing on the American experience 
with payday lending and payday lending regulation, and also a first-hand 
experience of attempting to obtain a payday loan in Toronto, Ontario.  
First an introduction to the “payday lending debate” is provided.  Second, 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.   I am 
grateful for comments from Tony Duggan, Benjamin Geva, Stephen Lubben, Jacob 
Ziegel, and for the input received at a presentation of an earlier form of this article to the 
Faculty Colloquium Workshop at Seton Hall Law School.  The splendid research 
assistance provided by Virginia Torrie, Catherine Nowak, and Zohar Levy is gratefully 
acknowledged.  Research for this article is current to April 8, 2008. 
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the business model for payday lenders operating in Canada is set out.  
Third, the evolving Canadian regulatory scheme is outlined.  The fourth 
section of the article documents six attempts to obtain loans from payday 
lenders in Toronto, Ontario.  The fifth section of the article provides an 
analysis of the American tools used for regulating payday lenders.  The 
sixth section of the article evaluates the evolving Canadian regulatory 
scheme in light of lessons drawn from the use of the various regulatory 
tools in the United States and the visits to Canadian payday lenders.  Part 
seven concludes with reflections on two possible directions for future 
research:  the role of Canadian corporate and securities law and the 
corporate social responsibility movement in facilitating a change in the 
practices of payday lenders and the potential of American Community 
Reinvestment Act style legislation in Canada. 
 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYDAY LENDING 
 
One of the most common forms of attack leveled against payday lenders 
begins with the author recounting the story of a borrower, usually a 
woman of modest means, often of a minority group, who takes out a 
payday loan for a small amount to make ends meet and ends up paying 
thousands of dollars in fees without ever paying off the principal.1  The 
interest charged by payday lenders is generally over 400 per cent annual 
percentage rate (APR),2 and other fees including rollover or extension fees 
                                                 
1 See for example:  Patricia Turner ended up paying $840 in extension fees for a $300 
loan which she was not able to pay down in Charles Bruch, “Taking the Pay Out of 
Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates 
Charged by Payday Lenders” (2001) 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257;  Sandra Harris’s 
experience with payday lenders resulted in her car being repossessed and wages garnered 
in Michael Bertics, “Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank 
Involvement” (2005) 9 N.C. Banking Inst. 133; most newspaper articles on payday 
lenders also start with a similar story, like Margaret Smith in “Caught in the Loan Trap: 
Paying it Back Can Become a Vicious Circle” (19 June 2004) Toronto Star. 
2 Creola Johnson, “Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?” (2002) 87 
Minn. L. Rev. 1 at 27; Kathleen E. Keest & Elizabeth Renuart, The Cost of Credit: 
Regulation and Legal Challenges, 2d ed. (Boston: National Consumer Law Center, 2000) 
at 297; Aaron Huckstep, “Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean 
Outrageous Profits?” (2006) 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 203 at 208; in Canada the 
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can further increase the cost of a loan.  Given that in Canada, the federal 
criminal usury rate is 60 per cent, the rates charged even by compliant 
payday lenders are far above what mainstream credit providers charge.  
Because the rate of interest charged is so high, the payday lending 
transaction has been described as “one-sided,” and not extending any real 
benefit to payday loan consumers.3  Further, payday lenders structure their 
loans in such a way as to be most profitable to them.  For example, the 
date on which the loan is due is usually the day before the borrower’s 
paycheque arrives, so lenders are able to charge additional fees for 
repayment after the due date.4 
 
Even if these fees and interest were reasonable for a single transaction, the 
fact that the majority of payday lenders are repeat customers means that 
many borrowers are trapped in the scheme for the long haul.5  Instead of 
encouraging customers to pay off their debt, payday lenders extend loans 
(for a hefty fee) or allow borrowers to take out new loans to repay the old 
ones;6 many payday lenders encourage customers to take out multiple 
loans at the same time.7  In fact, the very nature of the payday loan and its 
short duration (typically two weeks), means that rolling over loans is often 
inevitable for payday borrowers.8  This rollover feature can cause 
consumers to “accumulate an unmanageable cycle of debt.”9 
 
As two American commentators argue, payday lenders “feed off poverty 
and financial exclusion.”10  For example, the average American payday 
loan customer is likely to be a member of a minority group from an inner 
city neighborhood.11  Some sources (often payday lenders or organizations 
                                                                                                                         
situation is similar, as reflected in Protecting Canadians’ Interest: Reining in the Payday 
Lending Industry (ACORN Canada: Vancouver, 2004) at 1 [“ACORN Report”].  
3 Bruch, supra note 1 at 1279. 
4 ACORN Report, supra note 2 at 10. 
5 Bruch, supra note 1 at 1280; Huckstep, supra note 2 at 208. 
6 Bruch, supra note 1 at 1281. 
7 Bertics, supra note 1 at 138-9. 
8 Ibid. at 138. 
9 Carmen Butler & Niloufar Park, “Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility 
Save Payday Lenders?” (2005) 3 Rutgers J.L. & Urb. Pol’y 119 at 122. 
10 H. Palmer, Profiting from Poverty: Why Debt is Big Business in Britain (New 
Economics Foundation: London, 2002). 
11 Laurie Burlingame, “A Pro-Consumer Approach to Predatory Lending: Enhanced 
Protection Through Federal Legislation and New Approaches to Education” (2006) 60 
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representing them) paint a more flattering picture of payday borrowers, 
suggesting that payday customers make an average salary of around 
$35,000, a third of them own their homes, and that they have been in their 
jobs and homes for around 4 years.12  However, this description of the 
demographic is discredited by most academics, as numbers like that are 
sometimes reflective of county-wide averages rather than actual payday 
loan customers.13 
 
Often, payday loan customers have low fixed incomes.14  Their income 
leaves little room for coping with emergencies or additional expenses.  
The target customers for payday lenders rarely have the surplus in their 
budget they would need to pay back the interest fees charged by the 
lenders – if they did, they would not be turning to payday lenders in the 
first place.15 
 
One of the other accusations most often levied against payday lenders is 
that they prevent customers from making educated choices or shopping 
around because they are not clear about the fees they charge.  Many 
payday lenders hide basic information about their loans from customers.16  
Payday lenders have also been known to avoid disclosure of information 
like interest rates or finance charges until right before the agreement is to 
be signed.17  According to one study, payday lenders in Ohio do not 
typically disclose the triple digit interest rates they charge until after the 
payday loan agreement is signed.18  Other American payday loan 
providers refused to respond to an oral request from a borrower who 
                                                                                                                         
Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 460 at 462; Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen Keest, “The Two-
Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its 
Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society” (2000) 
51 S.C. L. Rev. 589 at 591. 
12 Drysdale &Keest, ibid. at 627. 
13 Ibid. at 629. 
14 Ibid. at 630, 631-2; Kurt Eggert “Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-
Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending” (2003) 36 Loy. 
L.A. L. Rev. 693. 
15 Bruch, supra note 1 at 1280. 
16 Bertics, supra note 1 at 139 citing Johnson, supra note 2 at 32; Butler, supra note 9 at 
121. 
17 Christopher L. Peterson, “Truth, Understanding, and High Cost Consumer Credit: The 
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act” (2003) 55 Fla. L. Rev. 807 at 898. 
18 Johnson, supra note 2 at 32. 
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wanted to know the APR of their loan.19  In another survey, only 37 per 
cent of payday lenders gave an “even marginally accurate APR” when a 
telephone inquiry was made about the cost of credit.20 
 
The misleading advertising is even more egregious in situations where 
there is a legitimately better option – for example, in the context of the 
American military, where active duty personnel can receive interest-free 
emergency loans but still turn to payday lenders because of their 
“powerful marketing campaigns.”21 
 
Even for borrowers who are somewhat aware that there are statutory limits 
on interest that can be charged (in some American states, and in Canada 
until the amendments to s. 347 of the Criminal Code), payday lenders can 
still convince them to borrow without violating their rights since they will 
often charge very little “interest” and collect the remainder of their money 
as various types of fees.22  However, where the issue has been litigated, 
courts have recognized that these fees are interest, and generally classified 
them as such when deciding cases.23 
 
There remains an upside to payday lending.  Consider the role that payday 
lending plays in servicing and giving access to credit to an otherwise 
neglected segment of the market.   Many customers of payday loans feel 
                                                 
19 Jean Ann Fox & Edmund Mierzwinski, “Rent-A-Bank: How Banks Help Payday 
Lenders Evade State Consumer Protections,” the 2001 Payday Lender Survey and Report, 
(CFA & State Public Interest Research Groups), online: 
<http://www.uspirg.org/reports/rentabank/paydayreportnov13.pdf> at 13. 
20 Bruch, supra note 1 at 1284. 
21 Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11 at 630-1. 
22 ACORN report, supra note 2 at 11; Bruch, supra note 1 at 1276.   
23 Bruch, supra note 1 at 1276; Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11 at 642.  The issue has 
not been fully litigated in Canada, however it is notable that a number of class actions 
have been recently certified based on restitutionary claims arising from the alleged 
charging of criminal rates of interest (under the earlier version of section 347 of the 
Criminal Code) on payday loans.  See:  McCutcheon v. The Cash Store Inc., [2006] O.J. 
No. 1860 (S.C.J.); Smith v. National Money Mart Co., [2007] O.J. No. 46 (S.C.J.); 
MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co., [2005] B.C.J. No. 399 (S.C.); Kilroy v. A OK 
Payday Loans Inc., [2006] B.C.J. No. 1885 (S.C.);  Bodnar v. Payroll Loans Ltd., [2006] 
B.C.J. No. 1705 (S.C.);  Tracy v. Instaloans Financial Solutions Centres (B.C.) Ltd., 
[2006] B.C.J. No. 1639 (S.C.); Bodnar v. The Cash Store Inc., [2005] B.C.J. No. 1904 
(S.C.); and Ayrton v. PRL Financial (Alta.) Ltd., [2006] A.J. No. 296 (C.A.). 
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they have nowhere else to go.24  Payday lenders target consumers who 
have low income and too little collateral to borrow from a bank.25  Banks 
also do not offer short-term, small loans, and very often payday loan 
customers are not able to qualify for a credit card.26  Customers frequently 
need the money for an emergency or unexpected expense,27 and are unable 
to find another source of credit with which to meet the cost.  Pawnbrokers 
require something to pawn, and borrowing from family members may be 
too embarrassing or difficult.28  Though payday lenders do charge a high 
rate of interest, some have argued that they are still cheaper than writing a 
cheque that is returned dishonoured,29 and to completely outlaw payday 
lenders may force this vulnerable group to turn to loan sharks and more 
criminal lenders.30 
 
Payday lenders are also quick and easy to access, and make minority and 
disenfranchised groups feel more at ease.  Sometimes, customers will 
choose payday loans over a bank because they are more friendly and 
accessible, providing more immediate liquidity.31  Other times, banks are 
just too inconvenient – payday lenders have more flexible hours than 
banks, and better locations.32  For example, in Toronto and Vancouver, 
banks have tended to close more branches in lower income areas, and 
“payday lenders are moving aggressively into this competitive vacuum.”33  
Payday lenders also make more of an effort to solicit the local community 
                                                 
24 Scott Andrew Schaaf, “From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending 
Industry” (2001) 5 N.C. Banking Inst. 339 at 344; Iain Ramsay, “Access to Credit in the 
Alternative Consumer Credit Market” (Paper prepared for Office of Consumer Affairs, 
Industry Canada, February 2000), online: <http://cmsweb.ca/epic/internet/incmc-
cmc.nsf/vwapj/ramsay_e.pdf/$FILE/ramsay_e.pdf> at 17. 
25 Butler & Park, supra note 9 at 123. 
26 Schaaf, supra note 24 at 343. 
27 Ibid. at 346. 
28 Huckstep, supra note 2 at 209. 
29 Schaaf, supra note 24 at 344 
30 Ibid. at 344. 
31 Ibid. at 344. 
32 Susan MacDonnell, Losing Ground: The Persistent Growth of Family Poverty in 
Canada’s Largest City (Toronto: United Way of Greater Toronto, 2007) at 49. 
33 ACORN report, supra note 2 at 15. 
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than banks, and will often have employees who speak the language of the 
dominant ethnic group of the neighbourhood.34 
 
II. THE BUSINESS MODEL FOR PAYDAY LENDERS IN 
CANADA 
 
The main line of business for payday lenders is, as the name implies, 
making payday loans.  Those are typically short-term, single-payment 
loans: The lender agrees to lend the debtor a certain amount of money, in 
return for the promise of repayment (usually on a cheque from the debtor, 
post-dated to the date of his or her next paycheque) and certain fees.  The 
fees are typically $15-25 per $100 of loan granted, and are fixed without 
regard to the term of the loan;35 it costs a consumer on average $50 to take 
out a $300 loan for 14 days.36  The average loan is about $280 for around a 
period of 10 days.37 
 
The lender determines the creditworthiness of the debtor through basic 
documentation – proof of identity that shows the borrower has attained the 
age of majority and the borrower’s address, and proof of a steady income 
and a chequing account.38  Many payday lenders advertise that they do not 
                                                 
34 Lesly Jean-Paul & Luxman Nathan, “Check Cashers: Moving from the Fringes to the 
Financial Mainstream, Communities and Banking” (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
Boston, Mass.), Summer 1999, online: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
<http://www.bos.frb.org/comaff/pdf/summer99.pdf> at 9. 
35 See Nicole MacIntyre, “A Maze of Fast Cash and Fees” Toronto Star (2 November 
2007), online: <http://www.thestar.com/News/article/279327>.  For example, Money 
Mart, an “industry leader” according to the Toronto Star, charges $18.94/$100/1 week; 
Speedy Cash charges $25 per $100 borrowed.  See also Iain Ramsay, “Access to Credit in 
the Alternative Consumer Credit Market” (Paper prepared for Office of Consumer 
Affairs, Industry Canada, February 2000), online: <http://dsp-
psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/C2-543-2000E.pdf>, though older suggests the same fees at 
ii. 
36 MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 48. 
37 “What is a Payday Loan?” (Hamilton: Canadian Payday Loan Association, 2008) 
online: <http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/aboutloans.php>. 
38 See, for example, payday loan providers like Payday Cash Advance Loans (online: 
<http://www.paydaycashadvanceloans.biz/faq.asp>) and Speedy Cash (<online: 
http://www.speedycash.ca/SC-cash-advances-payday-loans-howitworks.php>). 
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perform a credit check.39  In the case of default, practices vary, but few 
payday lenders will turn to litigation as the loans are for small amounts, 
and the likelihood of enforcing judgment against a defaulting payday 
borrower is low.40  Loans that cannot be recovered are written off by 
lenders as a bad debt expense.41  Despite the risks in the industry, in 
Canada, the annual profit for payday lenders in 2004 was estimated at $1 
billion.42 
 
Between the costs of bad debt, and the overhead and other costs of running 
a payday lending business, the average Canadian firm incurs a cost of 
$20.66 per $100 of loans.43  However, big loan operators have lower costs 
than smaller “mom-and-pop” operations, and if their market share is 
accounted for in creating a weighted average, the average cost is only 
$15.69 per $100 loan.44   
 
Naturally, profits per loan are higher for repeat customers than for first-
time borrowers, as the costs of opening a new client file and verifying 
employment information have already been incurred.  The cost of a new 
loan is $29.35 per $100 in a weighted average of payday lenders across 
Canada, while rollover or repeat loans only cost $14.15 in the same 
study.45  This means that as stores mature and gain more repeat business, 
they become significantly more profitable.46  
 
                                                 
39 Such as National Cash, (online: <http://www.apaydayloan.ca/ontariopaydayloan.php>) 
and Speedy Cash, (online: <http://www.speedycash.ca/SC-cash-advances-payday-loans-
howitworks.php>). 
40 Ramsay, supra note 24 at 18. 
41 The Cost of Providing Payday Loans in Canada (Ernst & Young: 2004) at 4 [“Ernst & 
Young Report”]. 
42 MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 49. 
43 Ernst & Young Report, supra note 41 at 29. 
44 Ibid. at 31. 
45 Ibid. at 7, 34, 36. 
46 See ibid.; see also Chris Robinson, Regulation of Payday Lending in Canada (ACORN 
Canada: Vancouver, 2006), online: 
<http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Centers/Press/Report/Payday_ 
Lending_Canada.pdf#search=per 
cent22acorn%C20study%C20payday%C20lenders%C20canada%22>; see also James 
Daw, “Consumer Protection in the Wind on Payday Loans” Toronto Star (30 May 2006) 
at D6 (discussing the Robinson report). 
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Fortunately for payday lenders, the debtors who use payday lenders are 
often repeat customers – Ernst & Young estimated that first-time 
borrowers end up taking out an average of fifteen loans.47  This desire for 
repeat customers can be seen through their behaviour as many payday loan 
companies encourage customer loyalty; one goes as far as offering a “no 
fee” third loan as a bonus for customer loyalty.48 
In Canada, typical borrowers are either young, single men, or young 
families with children,49 though other studies (commissioned by the 
payday lending industry) have found the average age of borrowers to 
range from 38 in Manitoba to 40 in British Colombia.50  They tend to be 
low-income, but employed, since proof of employment is required for 
many loans.51  Families with little savings or no credit cards, particularly 
those who had been refused, were significantly more likely to have used 
payday loans.52  
Families with outstanding bill or loan payments were more than four times 
as likely to have used payday loans, even after controlling for other key 
characteristics such as income and savings.53  Four in ten families who 
borrowed money through payday loans had spending that exceeded 
income, substantially more than families who had not used payday loans.54  
Almost half of families who used payday loans had no one to turn to if 
                                                 
47 Cited in MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 48. 
48 McIntyre, supra note 1. 
49 MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 49.  The Canadian Survey of Financial Security indicates 
that young families were three times more likely to have used payday loans than those 
aged 35 to 44, after controlling for other family characteristics.   See:  
<http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/75-001-XIE/10407/art-1.htm#Kitching>.  The 
Survey of Financial Security covered about 5,300 families and collected information on 
the assets and debts of families and individuals between May and July 2005. 
50 Payday Loan Customer Service – Manitoba (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday 
Loan Association <http://www.cpla-
acps.ca/english/reports/MB%20Pollara%20Poll%20Sept%202007.pdf> at 3, Payday 
Loan Customer Service – British Columbia (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday 
Loan Association  <http://www.cpla-
acps.ca/english/reports/3631%20BC%20CPLA%20Report%20FINAL%20(Oct%2026).p
df> at 3.  
51 MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 49. 
52 See <http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/75-001-XIE/10407/art-1.htm#Kitching>.   
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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they faced financial difficulty.55  More than one-quarter reported that they 
could not handle an unforeseen expenditure of $500, and nearly half could 
not handle one of $5,000. 56 
Payday lenders have primarily retail store locations, “tucked in between 
variety and convenience store outlets.”57  Their main appeal is that they 
provide cash instantly, without a hold period, and that they are “non-
judgmental” and friendlier than banks; often, payday lenders will ensure 
they have employees who speak the language of the local community to 
increase their appeal.58  That these business choices make a difference to 
borrowers can be seen through a recent survey of payday users in Ontario 
conducted on behalf of the Canadian Payday Lending Association, the 
majority of whom stated that they used payday lenders because they are 
quick and easy.59   
 
Payday lenders are not a homogenous group.  There are a few larger 
chains, and a number of smaller providers, some of which are being 
acquired by national chains (and have been since 2000),60 and not every 
payday lender is structured the same way.  There is the traditional model, 
where the payday loan outlet is lending its own money.  There is also the 
broker model, where the payday lender covers the overhead costs, but is 
lending out a third party’s money; the third party bears the risk of a loan 
default.  Finally, in the insurance model, the lender charges a fixed fee for 
the loans, and an additional insurance premium charge which is designed 
to cover the costs of the loan and the risk of a default; the insurance 
company which assumes this fee is usually owned by the same payday 
loan operator.61 
 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 43. 
58 Ibid. at 49; Ramsay, supra note 24 at 17. 
59 Payday Loan Customer Service – Ontario (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday 
Loan Association, <http://www.cpla-
acps.ca/english/reports/3631%20Ontario%20CPLA%20Report%20FINAL%20(Oct%202
6).pdf> at 11 and 15. 
60 Ramsay, supra note 24 at ii. 
61 Ernst & Young Report, supra note 41 at 7. 
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III. THE REGULATORY SCHEME GOVERNING PAYDAY 
LENDERS 
A. FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
 
The main federal legislation governing payday lenders is found in s. 347 
of the Criminal Code, which prohibits entering into arrangements or 
receiving payment of interest at a criminal rate.62  A criminal rate is 
defined as any interest rate of over 60 per cent per annum; interest 
includes all charges and expenses, such as fees or penalties, but not 
official fees or overdraft charges, for example.63  However, that legislation 
was drafted to aid police in prosecutions of loan sharks, rather than as 
consumer protection legislation.64  There have been two attempts to 
change the status of the section federally and make it more directed 
towards payday lenders.  The first, Bill S-19, failed due to an election.65  
Bill C-26, however, came into force after receiving Royal Assent on May 
3, 2007.  The Bill defines payday loans as “an advancement of money in 
exchange for a post-dated cheque, a preauthorized debit or a future 
payment of a similar nature but not for any guarantee, suretyship, 
overdraft protection or security on property and not through a margin loan, 
pawnbroking, a line of credit or a credit card.”66  It then exempts payday 
loans for under $1500 and for fewer than 62 days from the scope of the 
Criminal Code, allowing for provincial regulation of the area, if the 
province exercises its option to regulate under the new s. 347.1(3).67  
Essentially, the province must regulate to protect payday borrowers, at 
which point the Governor in Council will designate the province under the 
section, or allow it to “opt-out.” 
 
                                                 
62 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 347(1). 
63 Ibid., s. 347(2). 
64 Mary Anne Waldron, “Section 347 of the Criminal Code: ‘A Deeply Problematic 
Law’” (Paper presented to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, August 2003) online: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/Section-347-Criminal-Code.pdf> at para 2-3, 11. 
65 Jennifer Babe, “Section 347 of the Criminal Code of Canada: Business Law Problems 
Remain” (Paper presented to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, September 2007) 
at 4. 
66 Criminal Code, supra note 23, s. 347.1(1) 
67 Ibid., ss. 347.1(2) and (3). 
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Some provinces have subsequently taken steps to regulate payday lenders, 
though a few still have not.  The provinces that have not yet attempted to 
regulate payday lenders are: Newfoundland and Labrador, the Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon (though there possible amendments are 
under review).  The other provinces all have regulation, either in force or 
pending. 
 
B. PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION 
1. OVERVIEW 
 
The following is an overview of the recent provincial efforts to regulate 
payday lenders.  The chart found in Appendix A provides a detailed 
comparison of the provincial regulation.  Bill C-26 provides some 
direction as that what is required under the provincial regulation, however, 
it leaves room for the provinces to be designated and opt out of the federal 
regime with different approaches to regulation.  Bill C-26 requires a 
licensing or other type of authorization system for lenders, the 
establishment of limits on the total cost of borrowing, and a framework of 
protections for consumers.  In seeking to fit within the Bill C-26 
requirements for designation, the following five components are provided 
for in most provinces’ legislation, although there is variation among the 
provinces in how this is done: 
 
a. Interest Rate Caps: Each province’s regulation gives 
either the province, through regulation, or a body, such as 
the Energy Commission, the ability to set an interest rate 
cap.  With the exception of Quebec, which has set its 
interest rate cap at 35 per cent, and Manitoba, which has set 
its interest rate cap at 17 per cent the other provinces have 
not yet set interest rate caps. 
 
b. Cancellation Protection: One to two business days is 
provided by each province for borrower cancellation rights. 
 
c. Information in Agreement: There is variation among the 
provinces.  Some provinces require disclosure of the cost of 
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the loan and how this is done varies.  Other provinces only 
require a statement that the loan is a high cost loan. 
 
d. Rollover Prohibitions: Each province prohibits rollovers 
or charging an additional fee for a rollover. 
 
e. Licensing: Each province requires licensing of payday 
lenders and the requirements for licensing range from 
payment of a fee to sample loan documents.  The licensor 
differs from province to province. 
  
f. Posted Warning: With the exception of one province that 
has the ability to regulate this and has not done so and 
another province that does not provide for this component 
of the legislation, all provinces require disclosure of the 
cost of credit.  One province requires disclosure that the 
indicating that the loans are high cost loans. 
 
g. Remedies:  Remedies range from an administrative penalty 
of up to $10,000 to not being required to pay any amount 
over the principal amount borrowed. 
 
2. ALBERTA 
 
In their 2007 budget, the government of Alberta designated as one of its 
goals the reform of the Fair Trading Act to address marketplace issues 
around payday lenders.68  It intends to regulate payday lenders through 
regulations passed pursuant to that Act, but it is still in consultations at this 
point. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 “Budget 2007: Goal 2” (Government of Alberta: 2007) online: Ministry of Finance 
http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/publications/budget/budget2007/service_ab.html. 
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3. BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
In British Columbia, the Bill69 to regulate payday lenders was given royal 
assent on November 22, 2007 and amends the Business Practices and 
Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act.70  The Bill adds a 
Part 6.1 to the Business Practices and Consumer Act, with the title of 
“Payday Loans.”  This part allows the Lieutenant Governor in Council to 
set a maximum cost for payday loans and requires payday lenders to be 
licensed.71  It also sets out a host of rights for payday loan consumers, 
including the right to cancel the loan before the end of the subsequent day 
or if it does not satisfy the written notice requirements;72 sets out clear 
disclosure requirements;73 and prohibits rollovers and second loans while 
loans already exist.74    Licensing and compliance enforcement will be 
administered by the Business Practices and Consumer Protection 
Authority, a not-for-profit organization that operates at arm's length from 
government. 
 
4. MANITOBA 
 
After the changes to the Criminal Code, Manitoba made changes to the 
Consumer Protection Act75 through the Consumer Protection Amendment 
Act (Payday Loans).76 These changes require licensing for payday lenders, 
and require them to give warnings to their customers about the costs of 
borrowing.  The Act also authorizes the Manitoba Public Utility Board to 
set out a maximum cost of credit for payday loans, and prohibits additional 
fees on renewals, extensions, or new loans to replace old loans, unless 
otherwise authorized by the Board.  The new Act also prohibits signing 
over of future wages and title loans, and gives the right to cancel a loan 
within 48 hours without penalty.  Finally, the Manitoba Consumers 
                                                 
69 Bill 27, Business Practices and Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act, 
3d Sess., 38th Parl., British Columbia, 2007. 
70 S.B.C. 2004, c. 2. 
71 Ibid., s. 112.02. 
72 Ibid., s. 112.05. 
73 Ibid., s. 112.06. 
74 Ibid., s. 112.08(1)(a) and (b). 
75 C.C.S.M. c. C-200. 
76 S.M. 2006, c. 31. 
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Bureau has the right to inspect licensed premises, and to access unlicensed 
operations if there is evidence that payday loans are being made there.77 
 
Pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act, Manitoba has drafted the 
Payday Loans Regulation.78  This regulation specifies the licensing 
process and bonding requirements for payday lenders, and stipulates the 
information that must be in a loan agreement.79  It also requires payday 
lenders to post signs with clear warnings that “payday loans are high cost 
loans” and other information about the costs of payday lenders.80  Section 
147(1) of the Consumer Protection also provides the Manitoba Public 
Utilities Board with the ability to set a limit on the costs of credit given by 
payday lenders.  The Board set a 17 per cent interest rate cap on April 4, 
2008.81 
 
5. NEW BRUNSWICK 
 
In New Brunswick, Bill 4, An Act Respecting Payday Loans,82 passed the 
second reading as of December 12, 2007.  Like the other provinces, the 
Bill is designed to protect payday borrowers through licensing and 
bonding requirements for payday lenders,83 informational requirements on 
the payday loan itself (including all fees and penalties charged),84 no-fee 
cancellation options,85 posted information about the cost of loans,86 and it 
grants the government the ability to limit the cost of credit.87 
 
                                                 
77 “Province Announces Next Steps in Payday Loan Regulation” online: Government of 
Manitoba, <http://news.gov.mb.ca/news/index.html?archive=2007-6-01&item=1751>. 
78 Man. Reg. 99/2007. 
79 Ibid., s. 14. 
80 Ibid., s. 16(3). 
81 Consumer Protection Act, supra note 75, Part XVIII.  The interest rate cap was 
introduced by the Manitoba Public Utilities Board Act Order 39/08 online:  
http://www.pub.gov.mb.ca/pdf/misc/39-08.pdf. 
82 2d Sess., 56th Parl., New Brunswick, 2007. This Bill will amend the Cost of Credit 
Disclosure Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-28.3. 
83 Ibid., ss. 37.12; 37.15. 
84 Ibid., ss. 37.28(2)(m). 
85 Ibid., s. 37.29. 
86 Ibid., s. 37.3. 
87 Ibid., s. 37.31. 
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6. NOVA SCOTIA 
 
The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is currently in consultations to 
determine the limits to be set on payday lending.  To that end, they held 
public hearings in January 2008 to consider preliminary issues including 
the maximum cost of borrowing and the maximum fees or rates that could 
be charged by payday lenders.88 
 
The authority to embark on these consultations was granted by the 
Consumer Protection Act (amended), which received Royal Assent on 
November 23, 2006.89  Sections 18A-18U of that Act provide for similar 
protections to all other provinces.  There is a permit requirement for 
payday lenders,90 informational requirements in the loan agreement,91 and 
cancellation provisions.92  The Act also grants the Nova Scotia Utilities 
and Review Board the ability to set a maximum cost of borrowing and 
other controls.93 
 
7. ONTARIO 
 
In Ontario, amendments to the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 requiring 
greater disclosure by payday lenders are already in effect.  They pertain to 
the posting of a disclosure poster that must indicate certain pieces of 
information.  For instance, payday lenders must display the cost per 
hundred dollars of the loans they grant. They also require that payday 
lenders display the cost of a “$300 loan over a period of 14 days.”94  
Further changes also require a standard form for payday loans which will 
also provide greater information to the consumer.95   
                                                 
88 Nova Scotia Utilities Review Board, “Payday Loans, Notice of Public Hearings” 
online: Canadian Payday Loan Association <http://www.cpla-
acps.ca/english/reports/NS%20-Payday_Loans_Notice.pdf>. 
89 S.N.S., 2006, c.25. 
90 Ibid., ss. 18C-G. 
91 Ibid., ss. 18I-N. 
92 Ibid., s. 18Q. 
93 Ibid., s. 18T. 
94 O. Reg. 17/05 as am by O. Reg. 187/07 61.1.  According to 61.1 there is no 
requirement to have the APR disclosed on the poster, the only requirement is that it is 
disclosed in the loan agreement itself. 
95 Ibid., s. 62.1. 
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Most recently, on March 31, 2008 the Government announced Bill 48: 
Payday Loans Act,96 which will be in addition to the provisions in the  
Consumer Protection Act, 2002. It requires all payday lenders and brokers 
to be licensed and establishes a Registrar to inspect lenders and enforce 
provisions under the Act.97  The Act seeks to protect borrowers by 
prohibiting lenders from making misleading claims about the total cost of 
borrowing.98  It also provides for a two-day cancellation period where the 
borrower can cancel the loan agreement and pay back the advance.99  The 
lender is forced to return all documents and fees pertaining to the cost of 
borrowing, without penalty.  The Act also provides for very broad 
regulations pertaining to the specific responsibilities of licensees, 
governing their activities, setting limits that payday lenders and brokers 
may charge and governing the required contents for payday loan 
agreements.100  Remedies include: a rebate on the cost of borrowing for 
borrowers who entered into agreements not consistent with the Act, 
freezing of assets of delinquent lenders,101 and the imposition of 
administrative penalties not exceeding $10,000.102  
Finally, the Act established a special fund, known as the Ontario Payday 
Lending Education Fund (OPLEF), to educate borrowers about their rights 
under the Act.103 The OPLEF will be a non-profit corporation and will be 
funded in part by the payday lenders and brokers. The OPLEF is required 
to report on its activities and administration through an annual report to 
the Minister who will then deposit the report with the Assembly.104  
Ontario is the only province to include an educational component in its 
legislation. 
                                                 
96 Bill 48, Payday Loans Act, 1st Sess., 39th Parl., Ontario, 2008 (first reading on March 
31, 2008).  
97 Ibid., s. 5. 
98 Ibid., s. 26(1). 
99Ibid., s. 30(1). 
100Ibid., s. 77.  
101Ibid., s. 52(1). 
102Ibid., s. 59(1)-(3). 
103Ibid., s. 66-67.  
104 Ibid., s. 74.  
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The Minister hailed the new legislation as an attempt to balance protecting 
consumers while supporting a legitimate industry to continue to grow.105  
When pressed on why the legislation does not contain a clear 
unambiguous interest rate cap, the Minister said more information was 
required.  He established an independent expert panel, representing 
business and poverty activists, to examine the rate cap and report at a later 
date.106  
A number of Members of Parliament, such as Andrea Horwath, have 
already criticized the Bill as not going far enough to protect consumers.107 
She believes that an interest rate cap should be clearly included in the Bill 
as well as a 30 day “cooling-off” period for rescission.108  Another 
Member of Parliament, Cheri DiNovo, states that "We don't need payday 
lenders. Payday lenders are usurious. These are unnecessary services and 
they leech off the poor."109  Howard Hampton, leader of the provincial 
NDP Party, called the legislation superficial and criticized the government 
as being “scared” to put the payday loan industry out-of-business with an 
interest rate cap.110   
Representatives from ACORN Canada (Association of Community 
Organizations for Reform Now) again stressed the importance of an 
interest rate cap— "It's either going to protect people and keep money 
from getting sucked out of low-income neighbourhoods or not, depending 
on what the interest rate is.”111  Other poverty activists stressed the need 
for education that would actually find its way to the most vulnerable 
consumers.112  They recommend starting education campaigns in payday 
locations or through different anti-poverty groups.  However, poverty 
                                                 
105 Interview of Government Services Minister Ted McMeekin, (1 April 2008) on Metro 
Morning, CBC Radio, Toronto, CBC Radio Archives.  
106 Ibid.  
107 First Reading of Bill 48, Debates and Proceedings, March 31, 2008 
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/house-proceedings/house_detail.do?Date=2008-03-
31&Parl=39&Sess=1&locale=en#PARA139>. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Joanna Smith and Robert Benzie, “Payday loan crackdown” Toronto Star (April 1, 
2008), online: The Star <http://www.thestar.com/News/Ontario/article/407813>.  
110 Supra note 16.  
111 Supra note 20.  
112 Interview of Miryam Zeballos, (1 April 2008) on Metro Morning, CBC Radio, 
Toronto, CBC Radio Archives. 
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activists were quick to note that the education can only go so far when 
consumers are also placed with crushing time-pressures in paying back the 
loan within several days.113  The Canadian Payday Loan Association 
(“CPLA”) remains silent on the new legislation, as of April 1, 2008.  
However, in an interview CPLA President Stan Keyes, applauded the Bill 
as a right balance.114  Keyes refused to comment on an “interest rate cap 
based on APR”, calling it a meaningless number.115  However, he does 
support the use of fee caps of between $20-23 per $100 loan.116 
 
8. PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 
 
PEI’s Bill 100, Payday Loans Act, has not yet moved past the first reading, 
which occurred in the spring 2006 legislative session.117  However, if 
passed, the Bill will implement many of the same changes seen in the 
other provinces, including licensing,118 maximum cost of credit,119 getting 
appropriate information to the consumer,120 and penalty-free cancellation 
within the first 48 hours.121 
 
9. QUEBEC 
 
Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act requires that a lender have a license to 
operate there, and courts have decided to only grant licenses if creditor 
charges less than 35 per cent interest rate, because the loan is otherwise 
unconscionable under s. 8 and so can be denied under s. 325.122  There are 
no payday lenders legally operating in Quebec.123 
                                                 
113 Ibid.  
114 Supra note 16.  
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid.  
117 4th Sess., 62nd Parl., Prince Edward Island, 2007. 
118 Ibid., s. 10. 
119 Ibid., s. 11. 
120 Ibid., s. 12. 
121 Ibid., s. 13. 
122 R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, ss. 8, 325. 
123 Government of Ontario, “New Payday Lending Rules Now in Effect Across Ontario” 
online: Ministry of Government and Consumer Services 
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10. SASKATCHEWAN 
 
Like the other provinces that have sought to regulate payday lenders, 
Saskatchewan provides similar protections to borrowers in the province.  
An Act Respecting Payday Loan Agreements, Payday Lenders and 
Borrowers received royal assent and came into effect in May 2007.124  It 
has licensing requirements for lenders,125 disclosure requirements for the 
protection of borrowers through public signage126 and the credit 
agreement,127 and allows the province to set a maximum rate for credit.128  
However, again, the maximum has not yet been set by regulation. 
 
C. SELF-REGULATION BY PAYDAY LENDERS 
 
The CPLA is the largest Canadian association of payday lenders, and 
claims to represent 500 of the 1350 payday lending stores in Canada.129  It 
claims that its Code of Best Business Practices (“Code”) is recognized as 
the “world’s toughest voluntary code of conduct,” and it has recently set 
up a Commissioner of Ethics and Integrity, whose job it is to 
independently enforce the practices in the Code.130   
 
The Code, first and foremost, prohibits rollover loans, which are widely 
decried by industry critics.131  In doing so, it specifically bars members 
                                                                                                                         
<http://ogov.newswire.ca/ontario/GPOE/2007/08/01/c2939.html?lmatch=&lang=_e.html
>. 
124 2007, c. P-4.3. 
125 Ibid., Part II. 
126 Ibid., s. 21. 
127 Ibid., s. 18. 
128 Ibid., s. 23. 
129 Office of the Ethics and Integrity Commissioner, “Annual Report 2006-2007” 
(Canadian Payday Loan Association: Hamilton, 2008) online: 
<http://www.cplaethicscommissioner.ca/english/pdf/OEIC_CPLA_AnnualReport_0607.p
df> [“Annual Report”]. 
130 “Canadian Payday Loan Association Appoints Former Law Enforcement Official Sid 
Peckford Ethics and Integrity Commissioner” (RTO Online: 2006) online: 
<http://www.rtoonline.com/Content/Article/May06/CanadianPaydayLoanAssociationAp
pointsPickfordEthics050406.asp>. 
131 “Code of Best Business Practices” (Canadian Payday Loan Association: Hamilton, 
2008) online: <http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/consumercode.php>.  Recall that in most 
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from granting loan extensions for a fee, or from advancing a new loan to 
pay down an existing loan.  The Code also prohibits multiple loans in 
excess of the initial amount the lender was approved for, and prevents 
lenders from taking collateral.  Further, it sets a limit on the amount a 
member may charge on the default of the loan, and only allows lenders to 
charge post-maturity interest at a rate of $0.90/week for the first 13 weeks, 
and $0.50 per week thereafter. 
 
Members are also required to recommend credit counseling to any 
customer who has defaulted twice within a year, and offer to forego 
accrual of interest for customers who do go into counseling. There are also 
restrictions on the type of loans that a member may offer – a member may 
not give a loan based on some social assistance payments or take an 
assignment of wages, neither may they grant a loan over $1500 or a loan 
for a term of over 31 days. 
 
The Code also has similar requirements to many of the provinces’ 
proposed or enacted legislation, in allowing no-penalty cancellation of the 
loan if done by the end of the next business day.  It also stipulates that the 
member should disclose to the customer the “high-cost nature of the 
payday loan on all loan documentation.”132  Notably, however, the one 
area that the Code does not touch on is the amount that can be charged in 
fees and interest (until maturity) on loans. 
 
This Code is enforced by the Office of Ethics and Integrity Commissioner, 
a position funded by CPLA but designed to operate independently.133  Any 
complaints about a violation of the Code are made via a 1-800 number 
staffed by a full time Compliance Officer who will determine which 
prospective violations require further action, and will make submissions 
with recommendations on each violation for the Commissioner.  The 
Commissioner then has the mandate to investigate and follow-up on any 
violations brought to his attention; he also has the ability to issue 
                                                                                                                         
“horror stories” about payday loans in the press, the journalist will give the example of a 
person who got a rollover loan and ended up making payments for months without 
paying down the initial loan because the loan was rolled over. 
132 Ibid. 
133 “About the Office of the Ethics and Integrity Commissioner” (Canadian Payday Loan 
Association: Hamilton, 2008) online: 
<http://www.cplaethicscommissioner.ca/english/about.html>. 
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warnings, or fine or otherwise discipline members who have not complied 
with the Code.  In 2007, 164 complaints were made via the 1-800 number 
or email; 87 were deemed to merit further investigation; in 16 cases the 
Commissioner concluded a violation occurred; 10 members were 
sanctioned and the other 6 responded with a “satisfactory resolution” to 
the matter.134 
 
IV. CALLING ON CANADIAN PAYDAY LENDERS 
 
On March 22 and March 28, 2008, a female student research assistant, 
along with a male research partner visited 4 different payday lenders in 
downtown Toronto.  In two cases, two locations of the payday lender 
where visited, totaling 6 visits.  The research assistant who conducted the 
visits is a third year Osgoode Hall Law School student who is white, in her 
mid-twenties, has worked with the author on payday lending research for 
over three months, and has seven years of post-secondary education.  Her 
male friend, a third year medical student, is also white and in his mid-
twenties. 
 
The instruction provided to the student was to obtain all the information 
that she could about how much it would cost to obtain a payday loan and 
what she was required to do in order to obtain the loan.  The student has 
asked that her identity is kept anonymous as she is joining a law firm upon 
graduation from law school that represents a major player in the payday 
lending industry. 
 
A. ONTARIO DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR PAYDAY LENDERS 
 
Section 61.1(4) of the Consumer Protection Act requires the following 
statements:  
 
1. Total Cost of Borrowing per each $100 as heading (larger font) 
2.  Subheading indicating “$300 loan for 14 days” (smaller font) 
                                                 
134 Annual Report, supra note 129 at 7. 
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3.  "Principal Amount $300.00" AND "Total Cost of Borrowing" 
followed by the total cost of borrowing per each $300 advanced 
under the agreement 
4.  Horizontal line 
5.  “Total to Repay” 
6.  “This sign conforms to the disclosure requirements under the  
CPA” 
 
The visits to the payday lenders indicated that most of the required terms 
were provided as per statutory requirements, however, payday lenders’ 
interpretation of the terms varied widely.  The following table highlights 
the difficulty in trying to ascertain how much each loan cost and to 
compare the cost of borrowing as between the different lenders.  
 
Table 1 
 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
Money Mart Cash Money Cash Shop Cash Store 
Total Cost of 
Borrowing per 
$100  
(larger font) 
$1.78 and $19.45 
with optional 
cheque cashing fees 
$20.00 $20.00 $22.26  
*($100 includes a $20 
broker fee) 
“Example: $300 
loan for 14 days”  
(smaller font) 
No number 
included.  
$60.00 No number 
included. 
No number included. 
"Principal 
Amount”  
$300.00 $300.00 $300.00 $300.00 
"Total Cost of 
Borrowing"  
 
$5.34 $20.00 per $100 
borrowed 
$60.00 per $300 
borrowed 
$60.00 $66.79 
“Total to Repay” 
 
$305.34 $360.00 $360.00 $306.79 
* Does not reflect the 
net amount received; 
reflects the gross 
amount borrowed. 
“This sign 
conforms to the 
disclosure 
requirements 
under the CPA” 
Included.  Included.  Included.  Included.  
* This statement is printed on the Cash Store’s Disclosure Poster  
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B. VISITS TO 6 TORONTO PAYDAY LENDERS 
 
At each location, the student asked the following five questions.  The 
responses below are in her language.  She relied on her research partner to 
aid with data collection.  He would enter the store after she had left (or as 
she was leaving) and collect any promotional material they might have 
had.  After her departure from two of the six locations, the store employee 
commented, without prompting, to the rest of individuals in the store on 
‘how many questions’ she had asked, and that it was ‘funny’ for her to 
want to write things down.  These statements clearly indicate that the 
student’s haphazard way of collecting information was, in comparison to 
other payday borrowers, quite exceptional. 
 
 
1.  What is a payday loan? 
 
Most operators replied that a payday loan is a short-term loan.  
They would provide me with a certain amount of money, which I 
am expected to pay back on my next payday. This was usually 
about 10 days, but could be extended or reduced depending on the 
next time I would get paid.  
 
2.  What do I need to provide to qualify for a payday loan? 
 
The following documents were required for me to apply for a loan.  
But, it was not a guarantee of whether or not I’d be accepted.  The 
employees assured me that qualifying would take less then 10 
minutes.  But when I asked what the process would involve (ie. 
calling employers etc…) they didn’t answer but instead refocused 
my attention on how fast it would be.  
 
Money Mart: A current bank statement; latest pay stub; post-
dated personal cheque 
 
Cash Money:  Pay stub; personal cheque; bank statement (from 
today or the day before).  
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Cash Shop: Proof of continuous employment at the same job for 
six months; get paid through direct deposit; no more then 1 Non 
Sufficient Fund fee in the past 2 months; 2 pay stubs; 2 pieces of 
ID; A utility/phone bill; an updated bank statement for the last 45 
days  
 
Cash Store: a current bank statement; latest pay stub; personal 
cheque; utility bill; personal references (family members who had 
landlines were preferred).  
 
3. What is the most money I could get? 
 
All locations began by stipulating that I could get approved for up 
to 50% of my net salary. Cash Shop said that since “I looked ok” 
they would be able to go up to 70%. Cash Money also said that 
they could go up to 70% for repeat customers who had a ‘positive 
relationship’ with Cash Money.  
 
4.  How much does it cost to borrow? 
 
Each employee pointed to the poster and proceeded to read the 
poster to me. When I asked specifically what the terms ‘cost of 
borrowing’ and ‘total to repay’ meant, they declined to answer.  
 
The Term ‘Total Cost of Borrowing’ varies widely from $5.34 and 
$66.79. Furthermore Cash Money’s use of the term is confusing by 
stating the $20.00 first, even though the example asks for the $300 
example … which would then be $60.00.  
 
The term ‘Total to Repay’ is also widely misinterpreted.  You can 
see that Cash Money and Cash Shop are relatively 
straightforward, the consumer should repay $360.00 and one 
could assume that would be the total written on my post-dated 
cheque or direct transfer form. However, Money Mart and Cash 
Store indicate substantially lower levels of ‘Total to Repay’.  But 
these totals do not include the brokerage and optional cheque 
cashing fees, which are in most cases mandatory charges.  
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At Cash Store, I was told that the brokerage fees were mandatory, 
and were due to the fact that the Cash Store ‘linked, me, the 
borrower with an independent lender’. Cash Store did not actually 
lend me the money themselves.  I still do not know what total I 
would be required to write on my post-dated cheque. 
 
The optional cheque cashing fees employed by Money Mart were 
the most confusing.  All their advertising indicates that they charge 
59% interest, or about 90 cents/week per 100 dollar loan. However 
the advertising also seems to indicate that there is an ‘optional’ 
cheque cashing fee. Upon prompting, the store employee told me 
that if I paid back the loan in full on the loan due date (the day 
before my payday) I would pay the advertised rates. However, if I 
waited until payday, Money Mart would cash my cheque and 
charge an extra $19.95 per 100 dollars. This was seen as a 
convenience fee, and the employee stressed this was optional … 
kind of like valet parking. However, I find it very difficult to believe 
how someone who has limited income, and took out a loan in the 
first place, would then be able to pay it off BEFORE the receive 
their regular salary. Thus the vast majority of borrowers are 
forced to pay this convenience fee.  
 
I’m also concerned with the widespread use of the word ‘AND’ as 
opposed to ‘PLUS’. While it’s a small change (and not illegal) I 
don’t think it conveys to the consumer that they are also 
responsible for this charge. 
 
5. Can I get a copy of the information?  
 
Once they began providing details, I would ask if they had any 
information written down.  They usually had written information 
pertaining to the materials I needed to bring in to qualify for a 
loan.  However, none of the information about prices was written 
down, although they did let me copy the information on the poster 
down by hand when I prompted.  I clandestinely took the photos 
with my cell phone. 
 
I was able to get two loan applications. On Cash Shop’s 
application there appears to be a statement about wage 
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assignment—which is not legal in Ontario.  [Pursuant to The 
Wages Act, 1990, payday lenders are prohibited from taking wage 
assignments under Subsection 7 (7), which states that an 
assignment of wages to secure payment of a debt is invalid.  In 
addition, a representation that such assignments are valid may be 
considered a false, misleading or deceptive representation under 
the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.]  
 
6. What if I can’t pay the loan back? 
 
On both the Cash Store and Money Mart’s website it clearly says 
that no rollovers are permitted.  
 
The Cash Shop indicated that if I couldn’t pay off the loan that they 
would be able renegotiate something with me. Cash Store also said 
that I must pay off the loan, but if I thought that there was no other 
way … then I was supposed to come into the store and talk to them 
before my next payday.  
 
Cash Money also indicated that I would have to pay off the loan on 
my next payday.  But if I was in dire circumstances they would wait 
one or two days before cashing the cheque.  The Cash Money 
employee also said that I should consider using the ‘pick up’ 
option to pay off my loan.  If I come in on my payday (not the day 
before) and pay my loan in full, in cash, then they would 
immediately loan me the same amount of my previous loan.  This, 
she indicated, was considered a new loan and I would have to pay 
new fees associated with taking out a loan.  The Cash Money 
employee said the vast majority of individuals preferred the pick-
up option.  
 
I thought it was rather odd that people would want to go through 
the trouble of going to the payday loan, rather then letting the 
cheque clear, since at Cash Money there is no cheque cashing 
convenience fee.  In other words, it would cost the same to pick up 
the loan or to let the cheque clear.  She said that if individuals 
waiting 2 or 3 days for the cheque to clear, they would not be able 
to take out another loan (since borrowers are only allowed one 
loan at a time). With the pick-up option, they could take out the 
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new loan on the same day. One could assume therefore, that not 
only is this pick-up option a rollover, but that the majority of 
borrowers rely upon them.  
 
Even Money Mart, who prohibits rollovers under the CPLA Best 
Practices, stated I could apply for a ‘back-to-back’ loan. If I had 
enough funds to clear the first cheque, Money Mart would 
immediately loan me the exact amount that was just cleared from 
my account.   While not technically a rollover, the risk of debt 
spiral would still be present— as I would never have enough 
money to clear the loan and provide for myself for the next two 
weeks. Money Mart would also receive new fees from my ‘back-to-
back’ loan every two weeks. For example, if I pursued ‘back-to-
back’ loans for one year (26 loans) on a principal amount of $300 
I would pay roughly $60 in interest every two weeks. In this case, 
Money Mart would receive over $1,560 in interest (520% APR), 
for a $300 loan.   
 
The student reports the following conclusion regarding her experience in 
attempting to get a payday loan and the relevant information: 
 
I found it very difficult to determine how much the loan would 
ultimately cost me. I am therefore quite adamant in saying that the 
average payday loan consumer may not know how much they are 
paying for their loan when they sign the agreement, nor are they 
fully capable of ‘‘shopping around’ to find the best deal. 
 
I am even more convinced of my conclusion when one thinks that 
all payday loan borrowers, through the act of looking for a loan, 
are already under financial stress and will not be in the more 
contemplative state-of-mind I was experiencing. (i.e.  I didn’t 
actually need the loan to pay for groceries, facing the risk of 
eviction etc…) The stress of ‘getting the money now’ would 
drastically impair one’s ability to effectively compute the highly 
complicated and intentionally confusing information associated 
with payday loans.  
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V. AMERICAN REGULATORY LESSONS 
 
In contrast to the more mature American payday lending industry, and 
accompanying attempts at regulation, the Canadian payday lending 
industry is new and until fairly recently has been unregulated.  
Accordingly, this section reviews the dominant American approaches 
taken to regulate payday lenders with a view to drawing regulatory lessons 
for the Canadian context. 
 
A. DISCLOSURE 
 
The provincial regulation requires disclosure in the form of posted 
warnings and information in agreements about the cost of credit and the 
high cost of the loans.  Commentators reflecting on the American 
experience with disclosure as a tool for limiting predatory practices used 
by payday lenders suggest that disclosure should be made in the form of 
clear costs of borrowing rather than APR.  That is, it should be clearly 
stated that a loan will cost, for example, $20 for $100 borrowed for one 
week, totaling $120 for one week.  Any additional fees should also be 
clearly noted.  The total cost should be posted clearly at the front of the 
store or on the counter in a similar fashion to the way that banks post the 
daily exchange rate.  In addition, the posted notice should clearly indicate 
that these loans are intended to be short-term.  The Ontario legislation, like 
the other proposed and proclaimed provincial legislation, attempts to 
provide for this information, however, as was evidenced by the on-site 
visits, the variation in the way that this information was provided made it 
difficult to understand and also difficult to compare among stores. 
 
Doubt is cast on the potential of disclosure as a regulatory tool by the 
research on bounded rationality that suggests that consumers do not 
always act in the rational way that underlies the rationale for disclosure.135  
As is highlighted by the research on the American experience with 
disclosure regulation, various other factors, such as convenience and sunk 
search costs, may limit the utility of disclosure.136  On the other hand, the 
                                                 
135 Ramsay, supra note 24 at 30. 
136 Ibid.  
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provision of comparative price and term information by a neutral third 
party has been put forward as the most effective form of disclosure.137  
None of the current provincial regulatory schemes or proposals provide for 
this relatively low-cost measure. 
 
B. LICENSING 
 
Licensing of payday lenders by third party provincially regulated bodies 
holds the potential to address the issues surrounding the utility of 
disclosure.  In addition to serving a gatekeeping function, such bodies are 
in a position to provide an effective form of information disclosure, 
including comparative information.  To assist customers with shopping 
around prior to visiting a payday lender, licensees should be required to 
provide daily reports of fees to the licensor, who should in turn make these 
available to potential borrowers on the internet or through other means.  
Further, on-site visits from provincial regulators may deter lenders from 
making oral representations that contradict posted disclosure, disclosure in 
agreements, or provincial legislation.  The on-site visits to the Toronto 
payday lenders illustrate that large operators are violating the self-
regulatory standards they helped craft surrounding rollovers, for example.  
 
The funding for on-site visits would come from licensing costs paid by the 
payday lenders.  The challenge will be for the licensing body to resist 
becoming “captured” by the payday lending industry.  This concern should 
be factored into decisions surrounding the appropriate licensing 
framework.  That is, whether the licensor should be within the provincial 
consumer affairs ministry or a delegated administrative authority where an 
arm’s length agency administers the regime.  The provinces where there is 
a public utility commission or board appear to have delegated authority to 
these semi autonomous provincially regulated bodies.  The other provinces 
appear to have taken the former approach. 
 
 
                                                 
137 Ibid. 
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C. ROLLOVERS 
 
Each province that has put forward regulation has prohibited rollovers or 
charging an additional fee for a rollover.  This prohibition is also found in 
the industry’s self-regulation.  Given that rollovers are a clearly a regular 
practice associated with the business model for payday lenders operating 
in Canada, and that the existing prohibition imposed by payday lenders’ 
self-regulatory body is ignored by lenders, a different approach is 
necessary.  It may be more reasonable to regulate the conditions for a 
rollover to take place and to require disclosure of not only the cost of the 
loan but also the cost of a rollover.  In addition, a cap may be set on the 
number of times a rollover may be permitted and posted warnings about 
the high cost of rollovers may be considered.  
 
D. ENFORCEMENT 
 
While class actions have entered the scene as an attempt to use the judicial 
system to obtain a remedy for usurious interest rates charged by payday 
lenders, the results remain to be seen.  Class actions aside, most low 
income borrowers will not have the resources to take action in court 
against payday lenders.  Accordingly, the most effective method for 
enforcing the requirements in the new legislation is a simple vehicle for 
complaint to the licensor that will result in non-recovery of the loan 
amount by the lender.  A number of the proposed or existing provincial 
regimes merely provide that the interest will not be recoverable if the 
legislation is violated.  This is an insufficient form of deterrence; the 
principle and interest should not be repayable.  Detailed statistics should 
be kept on all on-site visits, complaints, and resolutions. 
 
E. EDUCATION AND COUNSELING 
 
In contrast to some American states counselling has not been adopted as 
part of the provincial regulatory models.  While there has been much 
criticism regarding the counselling requirement for bankruptcy in Canada, 
it may be a helpful tool, when used in conjunction with the other tools 
discussed, in this context.  Potential borrowers should be required to 
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participate in counseling session prior to taking a second payday loan in a 
set period of time or attempting to rollover a payday loan.  Such sessions 
may be provided online for literate consumers or in person and should be 
financed through the payday lenders, but provided by the government 
through the licensing body or another delegated authority.  The counseling 
cost should not be passed on to potential borrowers. 
 
The main criticism leveled against counseling in the bankruptcy context is 
that it adopts a “blame the victim” approach and focuses on helping the 
debtor adopt better financial management practices.  While in some 
instances instruction on better budgeting practices may be helpful, often 
low income debtors will simply not have the money available to budget 
with.  It would be more useful to outline the borrower’s rights with respect 
to their outstanding payday loans.  For example, the fact that it is not cost 
effective for payday lenders to commence an action against a borrower for 
an unpaid loan, may be helpful information to a debtor contemplating her 
options.  In addition, a detailed explanation of the costs associated with 
rolling over a loan and exploration of other possible sources of longer term 
credit may be helpful.   
 
Consideration should also be given to introducing some form of financial 
education into the high school curriculum or even college and university 
level curriculum.  In addition, public education sessions financed by the 
licensing fees paid by payday lenders and held by licensors would be 
helpful.  The OPLEF provided for under the new Ontario legislation 
provides a model for this approach.  The implementation of either form of 
education should not be used to justify limiting other measures such as 
disclosure or interest rate caps. 
 
F. INTEREST RATE CAPS 
 
As increased regulatory measures are imposed on payday lenders they will 
undoubtedly argue that these measures will drive them out of business.  
The democratization of credit that payday lenders have helped facilitate is 
not in itself a bad thing and should not be treated as such.  The Quebec 
experience, where registration and a maximum interest cap of 35 per cent 
are in place, and where there are no payday lenders operating in the 
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jurisdiction may be used to illustrate the impact that regulatory decisions 
may have on the continued viability of the industry.  However, it is 
important to highlight that Credit Unions have played a much more 
prevalent role in the Quebec alternative credit market, and accordingly, 
interest rate caps are not a complete explanation.138  Further, the American 
experience suggests that payday lenders can adapt their business model to 
a regulated lending environment with interest rate caps.  In implementing 
interest rate caps, it will be important to follow Ramsay’s line of 
reasoning, “there is probably a convincing argument that may be made for 
using interest rate ceilings as a method of protecting against excessive 
rates but not as a means of second guessing market rates.”  Market rates in 
this context need to account for the current practice of not performing 
credit checks or detailed assessments of ability to pay prior to providing 
payday loans to borrowers in Canada.  Introducing such practices in this 
market will limit access to credit for groups of borrowers that are 
otherwise excluded from accessing credit and potentially push them into 
even more expensive and unregulated arenas. 
 
To date, other than Quebec, only Manitoba has settled on an interest rate 
cap.  A formula that attaches both to the changing markets and limits on 
excessive rates will need to be developed as the other provinces move 
forward.  Consultation on appropriate rates should not be limited to the 
lenders or financial experts, but should also include poverty experts and 
payday loan consumers. 
 
G. PROVINCIAL HARMONIZATION 
 
The Uniform Law Conference of Canada appears to have given limited 
attention to the issue of payday lenders following the amendment to the 
                                                 
138 Ibid. at 37.  Given that the Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over 
banking, interests and negotiable instruments and the provinces over property and civil 
rights, there may be a constitutional issue related to the provinces setting interest rate 
caps.  However, as Mary Anne Waldron has concluded, “while the Federal government 
was given the exclusive power to legislate on interest in the constitution, the provincial 
legislatures have been permitted by the courts to care out a significant and, perhaps 
widening sphere of jurisdiction.”  M. Waldron, The Law of Interest in Canada (Caswell:  
1992) at 28, as cited in Ramsay supra note 24 at 27. 
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Criminal Code giving the provinces the ability to regulate in this area.139 
The Consumer Measures Committee (CMC), a federal-provincial-
territorial intergovernmental working group that seeks national approaches 
to consumer protection issues has also give the issue limited 
consideration.140  Ontario’s Ministry of Government Services Policy and 
Consumer Protection Services Division indicates that it’s “preference is 
for a harmonized national approach to regulation and interest rate setting, 
with a federal lead on rate setting to create a national standard for the 
industry.”141  However, to date an analysis and recommendations 
surrounding the harmonization of payday lending legislation has not been 
provided and multiple provincial attempts at reform appear to be 
simultaneously proceeding without an attempt at national consultation.  
Ramsay provided a Model Act with his report in 2000, however, a 
harmonized approach has not been adopted by the provinces.  It continues 
to be true that vulnerable consumers’ interests and needs with respect to 
payday lenders do not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction so as to justify 
the variation in existing and proposed legislation in this area continue,142 
however, there remains no Canadian experience to justify choosing one 
regulatory approach over another. 
 
Ultimately an effort should be made to work towards a Model Act.  
However, at this early stage in seeking to regulate a previously 
unregulated industry variation in provincial regulation may be a useful 
way to assess the effectiveness of various approaches to regulating the 
industry.  In addition, future work will need to consider the limits of 
domestic regulation of payday lenders and the extent to which the internet 
and other technologies are facilitating payday lending across provincial 
and national borders.   
 
 
 
                                                 
139 Babe, supra note 65. 
140 “Alternative Consumer Credit - Working Group” online: Consumer Measures 
Committee <http://cmcweb.ca/epic/site/cmc-cmc.nsf/en/fe00025e.html>. 
141 Consumer Protection in the Payday Lending Sector (April 27, 2007) online:  
<http://www.gov.on.ca/mgs/graphics/126614.pdf>. 
142 Ramsay, supra note 24 at 27. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has focused on assessing the evolving Canadian payday 
lending regulatory framework as a discrete area of regulation of 
overindebtness of low income Canadians.  A detailed assessment and 
comparison of the regulation of other forms of credit in the alternative 
credit market was beyond the scope of the current project.  The ability and 
the willingness of the provinces to regulate payday loans following Bill C-
26 provide a unique opening.  The development of ex-ante regulation that 
will at the same time continue to grant low-income Canadians access to 
credit through payday loans and protect them from predatory practices, 
provides an occasion to reflect on best practices for regulating 
overindebtness of lower income Canadians.  Up until this point, for the 
most part, only middle-class Canadians had access to expansive regulation 
and relief from overindebtness through the bankruptcy regime.  While an 
increasing number of low-income Canadians now have access to credit, 
they continue to have limited access to the bankruptcy regime.  Apart from 
measures aimed at increasing access to this ex-post remedy, the current 
process of providing ex-ante relief is also promising.  In order to make this 
form of regulation meaningful lessons from the American experience 
should be taken seriously and regulation that is helpful to the actual 
consumers of payday loans should be carefully developed.  An ongoing 
effort should be undertaken to evaluate and compare provincial efforts at 
regulation with a view to developing a domestic, and possibly in the 
future, international model payday lending legislation.  
 
The provincial reform efforts may contribute to the development of a 
heightened sense of corporate social responsibility on the part of payday 
lenders, which may in turn also facilitate a change in their lending 
practices.  As the payday lending industry expands in Canada, an 
increasing number of payday loans are offered by publicly traded 
corporations that are accountable to an increasing number of shareholders 
and other corporate stakeholders.  Future research should consider the role 
of Canadian corporate and securities law in facilitating a change in the 
corporate governance practices of payday lenders.  In addition, further 
research is necessary on the role of regulation and governance practices in 
ensuring that mainstream financial institutions operate in a socially 
responsible way in relation to lower income debtors. 
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Canadian banks, like their American counterparts, have been quite 
reluctant to deal with low-income borrowers in a more direct fashion.  
They risk criticism if they reject too many customers, or charge higher 
interests rates or use remedies such as foreclosure.143  Therefore, there is a 
tendency for larger financial institutions to just avoid an area, making it 
very attractive to predatory lenders.  This practice dates back to the middle 
of the twentieth century when many American banks discriminated against 
certain racialized neighbourhoods through the practice of redlining.144  As 
a result, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to 
mandate financial institutions “serve the convenience and needs of the 
communities in which they are chartered to do business”.145   Federal 
examiners evaluate a bank’s community reinvestment efforts through three 
tests in lending, investments and service.146  These ratings are published 
for the public to review.  The examiners can also deny applications or 
place conditions on the approval of deposit facilities if the CRA ratings are 
not adequate.147  The CRA seeks to balance a bank’s benefits and burdens: 
banks that profit from community deposits should be encouraged to extend 
credit to those same communities.148   
 
The CRA provided some direction for the Canadian Department of 
Finance's White Paper on "Reforming Canada's Financial Services 
Sector."149  In that document, increased CRA-style disclosure was 
recommended, but it was noted that a full CRA regime is not warranted in 
Canada, and that other mechanisms could be used to promote 
accountability.150  Instead of the CRA, the paper proposed that all financial 
institutions with equity of over $1 billion disclose information on their 
philanthropy, their employees' community service, and their efforts to 
                                                 
143 Hellwig, supra note 138 at 1582; MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 49. 
144 The term redlining originated from a lender’s habit of outlining a specific ‘poor 
neighbourhood’ in red to indicate and exclude the area from lending as it was too high 
risk.  
145 Emily Berkman, “Microloans as a Community Reinvestment Act Compliance 
Strategy” (2006) N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 329.  
146 Ibid.  
147 Ibid.  
148 Ibid. 
149 Finance Canada, "Reforming Canada's Financial Services Sector: A Framework for 
the Future" (Finance Canada, 1999). 
150 Ibid. 
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promote small businesses, micro-credit, and access to banking services.  
Some of these recommendations were adopted in Bill C-8, An Act to 
Establish the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada and to Amend 
Certain Acts in Relation to Financial Institutions.151  The Act created the 
Financial Consumer Agency, responsible for making sure banks follow 
through on their obligations under the Bill, and requires institutions with 
equity of over $1 billion to publish an annual "Public Accountability 
Statement" providing the information detailed above.152  However, critics 
feel that this is still inadequate, as it does not provide information about 
demand for financing, and whether the banks are appropriately meeting 
the demand.153  Nor does it produce regular data based on neighbourhood 
(only by province), or by the characteristics of borrowers, unlike the 
information produced under the CRA.   
 
The inquiries into whether Canada should move closer to the United States 
in adopting CRA style legislation and the role that corporate governance 
practices and regulation play in improving payday lending practices are 
important research questions as Canada moves forward with a regulatory 
scheme that takes into account the increasing democratization of credit.
                                                 
151 Bill C-8, An Act to Establish the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada and to 
Amend Certain Acts in Relation to Financial Institutions, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001 
online: 
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2331014&Languag
e=e&Mode=1> (assented to 14 June 2001), 2001, c. 9. 
152 Ibid., s. 3. 
153 “Comparison of Amendments set out in Bill C-8 to Financial Institution and other 
Laws vs. CCRC Recommendations” (2001) online: CCRC 
<http://www.cancrc.org/english/recomm01.html>. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 2 
 
Provincial Payday Lending Legislation 
 British 
Columbia 
Manitoba New 
Brunswick 
Nova 
Scotia 
Ontario Prince 
Edward 
Island 
Quebec Sask. 
Title of 
Legislation 
Bill 27, Business 
Practices and 
Consumer 
Protection 
(Payday Loans) 
Amendment Act 
Payday Loans 
Regulation; 
Consumer 
Protection Act 
(Act) 
Bill 4, An Act 
Respecting 
Payday Loans 
Bill 87: 
Consumer 
Protection 
Act 
(amended) 
Bill 48: Payday 
Loans Act (2008) 
(PLA) 
Bill 100, 
Payday 
Loans Act 
Consumer 
Protection 
Act 
An Act 
Respecting 
Payday Loan 
Agreements, 
Payday 
Lenders and 
Borrowers 
Authority to 
set Interest 
Rates 
Given to 
Lieutenant 
Governor in 
Council, can set 
the 
maximum 
amount, or 
establish a rate, 
formula, tariff 
or method of 
determining the 
maximum 
amount for  
-interest, -
permissible 
charges, and -the 
total cost of the 
loan (s. 112.02) 
That authority is 
found in s. 147 of 
the Act, not yet 
enacted 
New 
Brunswick 
Energy and 
Utilities Board 
can fix the 
ultimate cost 
of credit 
(37.31); can 
also limit the 
percentage of a 
person’s 
income as a 
cap on the 
amount they 
can borrow 
(37.36) 
Lenders 
can’t 
charge 
more than 
maximum 
set by Nova 
Scotia 
Utility and 
Review 
Board (18J) 
Lieutenant Governor 
may make 
regulations   
prohibiting lenders 
from making a 
payday loan 
agreement with a 
borrower if the 
amount of the payday 
loan exceeds the 
prescribed amounts 
or the amounts 
calculated according 
to the prescribed 
manner (s.77.19, 
PLA) 
 
Lieutenant Governor 
may make 
Commission 
can set a 
maximum 
on any 
payments 
that 
contribute to 
the cost of 
credit (s. 11) 
Statutory 
35% APR 
cap (ss. 8, 
325) 
Lieutenant 
Governor in 
Council will 
limit the total 
amount that a 
payday 
lender can 
charge with 
respect to the 
loan (s. 23) 
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regulations 
specifying limits for 
the purposes of 
section 32 (Total 
Cost of Borrowing) 
or specifying a 
method of setting 
limits for the 
purposes of that 
section. (s.77.23, 
PLA)                             
 
Cancellation 
Protection 
May cancel 
without penalty 
before the end of 
the next business 
day after the loan 
was made, or at 
any time if the 
loan was made in 
contravention of 
other protections 
in the act or 
without 
informing 
customer of 
cancellation right 
(s. 112.05) 
Found in s. 
149(8) of the Act, 
not yet enacted 
May cancel 
without 
penalty within 
48 hours 
(excluding 
Sundays and 
holidays) of 
the first 
advance; or at 
any time if 
there is no 
notification of 
cancellation 
rights (s. 
37.29) 
Can cancel 
before end 
of business 
day after 
loan is 
granted, or 
at any time 
if not 
informed of 
rights 
(18Q) 
The borrower may 
cancel, without any 
reason, the agreement 
at any time up to the 
end of the second day 
after the time that  
the agreement was 
signed (and the 
advance received) if 
the lender is open for 
business. If they are 
not open for business, 
then the next day. 
(s.30(1)(a) PLA) 
 
If this occurs then the 
effect is like the loan 
never existed and the 
borrower must pay 
back the advance 
given, and the 
borrower must return 
all fees and 
documents associated 
with the loan. (s.43, 
Can cancel 
within 48 
hours 
(excluding 
Sundays and 
holidays) 
and any 
other time if 
not informed 
of 
cancellation 
rights (s. 13) 
NA May cancel 
by end of 
business day 
after loan 
agreement 
was entered 
into, or at any 
time if there 
was no notice 
of 
cancellation 
rights (s. 22) 
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PLA) 
 
Information in 
Agreement 
Must include 
total cost of 
credit and APR; 
a statement that 
interest only 
applies to the 
loan principal; 
and a warning 
that it is a “high 
cost loan”; and 
cancellation 
rights (s. 112.06) 
Must include total 
cost of credit and 
APR; term of 
loan; itemization 
of all fees; and a 
statement 
encouraging 
customers to take 
questions or 
concerns to the 
Consumer’s 
Bureau (s. 14) 
s.14 is in addition 
to s.148(1)(a) [not 
yet enacted] 
which demands: 
 (i) states the date 
and time of day 
that the initial 
advance is being 
made or the card 
or other device is 
being provided,  
(ii) states that the 
loan is a high-cost 
loan, (iii) gives 
notice of the 
borrower's right 
to cancel the loan 
within 48 hours 
after receiving the 
initial advance  
 
Must include 
total cost of 
credit and 
APR; each of 
the fees 
regulated by 
the Board that 
apply; a 
statement a 
payday loan is 
a high cost 
loan; 
cancellation 
rights and 
remedies (s. 
37.28) 
Lender 
must give 
borrower in 
writing 
information 
on exact 
amount 
loaned, the 
exact fees, 
regulated 
maximum 
fees, and 
cancellation 
rights (18I) 
Lieutenant Governor 
may make 
regulations governing 
information text, or 
terms that a lender is 
required to include in 
a payday loan 
agreement. Also may 
make regulations 
governing the form 
that a lender is 
required to use for 
the information, text 
or terms. (s.77.21-22, 
PLA)   
 
At the time 
of loan, 
borrower 
must get a 
document 
saying that it 
is a high 
cost loan, 
giving right 
to 
cancellation. 
(s. 12) 
NA Before 
entering into 
loan, must 
provide 
disclosure 
document 
stating that 
this is a high 
cost loan, 
include an 
explanation 
of all 
amounts 
charged, and 
give notice of 
cancellation 
rights (s. 20) 
Rollover 
Prohibitions 
Cannot grant 
rollovers; or new 
Limit on charges 
for extension, 
No payday 
lender shall 
No 
rollovers, 
The lender under a 
payday loan 
Can’t accept 
payment for 
NA No 
concurrent 
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loan when 
existing loan 
exists from the 
same lender (s. 
112.08) 
renewal or 
replacement (s. 
152 of Act, not 
yet enacted) 
grant a 
rollover loan 
(s. 37.34) 
no new 
loans where 
loans 
already 
exist with 
the same 
lender(18N
(c)(h)) 
agreement shall not 
enter into a new 
payday loan 
agreement with the 
borrower before at 
least seven days have 
passed since the 
borrower has paid the 
full outstanding 
balance under the 
first agreement. 
(s.35(1), PLA) 
 
No loan broker shall 
facilitate the making 
of more than one 
payday loan 
agreement between 
the same borrower 
and different lenders 
unless seven days 
have passed since the 
borrower has paid the 
outstanding balance 
under the first 
agreement. (s.35(3) 
of PLA) 
 
The lender under a 
payday loan 
agreement shall not 
extend the agreement 
unless the regulations 
permit extensions of 
payday loan 
agreements and the 
extension complies 
extension or 
renewal of 
loan except 
as 
authorized 
by an order 
of the 
Commission 
(s. 16) 
loans are 
permitted (s. 
28); renewal 
loans don’t 
appear to be 
explicitly 
prohibited (s. 
23 just says 
that lenders 
can’t charge 
more than 
maximum set 
by regulation 
for renewals) 
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with the prescribed 
requirements. 
(s.36(1), PLA) 
 
Lieutenant Governor 
may make 
regulations as to the 
definition of what 
constitutes an 
extension of a payday 
loan agreement 
(s.77.24) PLA 
Licensing  
 
 
Requires payday 
lenders to be 
licensed and 
regulates aspects 
of their 
transactions with 
consumers.  
 
Licensing and 
compliance 
enforcement will 
be administered 
by the Business 
Practices and 
Consumer 
Protection 
Authority, a not-
for-profit 
organization that 
operates at arm's 
length from 
government. 
 
Consultation is 
currently in 
One year license 
costs $5,500; 
must provide 
sample loan 
documents for a 
$300 loan that 
complies with 
regulations and an 
undertaking from 
director that s/he 
knows about the 
consumer 
protection laws 
(s.7, 8); licensees 
must also provide 
bonds (s. 10) 
 
May apply to 
Minister for 
license; must 
pay fee and 
provide the 
application 
and all other 
documents 
required by the 
Minister (s. 
37.12-14); 
licensee must 
also provide 
bond (s. 36.15) 
Need 
permit to 
give payday 
loans, can 
get permit 
through 
registrar 
and must 
pay fees 
(18C-D)  
Each payday lender 
(s.6(1)), and loan 
broker (s.6(2)) is 
required to hold a 
license issued by the 
Registrar. The 
Registrar can suspend 
or revoke a license in 
some cases. (s.12) In 
selected cases, the 
applicant for a license 
(or a renewal) is 
entitled to a hearing 
before the License 
Appeal tribunal. 
(s.13(7)) 
 
An applicant for a 
license (or renewal) 
must disclose 
changes in corporate 
control and address. 
(s.22(1)) The 
Registrar may at any 
time require a 
Licences are 
required, 
need an 
application 
and fee to 
get one (ss. 
3-4) 
Licenses are 
only granted 
to lenders 
who charge 
a maximum 
35% APR.  
There are no 
legal payday 
lenders in 
Quebec. 
Licenses are 
required (s. 
5-6), and 
lender may 
be required to 
provide a 
bond or other 
financial 
security (s. 7) 
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progress on 
licensing 
requirements. 
 
 
licensee to provide 
the Registrar with 
copies of materials 
that the licensee uses 
or proposes to use in 
the course of 
conducting business.  
(s.47(2)) (all sections 
pertain to the PLA) 
Posted 
Warnings 
Questions 
pertaining to a 
disclosure 
regime was  
included in the 
BC Consultation 
Paper.  
Sign must say 
“Payday Loans 
are High-Cost 
Loans” and give 
the cost in dollars 
for a $300 loan (s. 
16) 
 
This is in 
conjunction with 
s.156 [not yet 
enacted] 
 
All lenders must 
post signs. The 
signs must be 
posted 
prominently and 
in accordance 
with the 
regulations, and 
must clearly and 
understandably 
set out, in the 
form required by 
the regulations,  
(a) all 
components of 
Payday lender 
must post 
signs that 
clearly set out 
full cost of 
credit (s. 37.3) 
Governor in 
Council can 
make 
regulations 
regarding 
the display 
of fees, 
charges, 
rates and 
products 
offered; 
(18U(k)) 
61.1(4) of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act requires specific 
disclosure on the cost 
of borrowing. 
Must post 
signs that set 
out, clearly 
and 
prominently, 
all 
components 
of the cost 
of credit, 
including 
fees, 
charges, 
interest, etc. 
(s. 20) 
NA Must post 
sign setting 
out costs of 
all 
components 
of cost of 
credit (s. 21) 
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the cost of credit, 
including all fees, 
charges, penalties, 
interest and other 
amounts and 
consideration for 
a representative 
payday loan 
transaction; and  
(b) any other 
information 
required by the 
regulations.  
 
Remedies Borrower 
doesn’t have to 
pay or is entitled 
to refund for any 
money paid over 
the maximum 
set; if there is a 
rollover, 
borrower doesn’t 
have to pay or is 
entitled to a 
refund of 
anything over the 
principal of the 
first loan 
(112.10) 
An administrative 
penalty (of $1000, 
$3000, or $5000) 
can be levied if 
there is a 
violation of the 
maximum credit 
charge or limits 
on charges of 
renewals (s. 19); 
The lender must 
reimburse 
borrower for fees 
charged over the 
maximum (s. 147 
of Act) or for 
rollovers (s. 152). 
If there is a 
violation of the 
maximum cap 
on cost of 
credit, then the 
lender must 
reimburse or 
cannot charge 
the borrower 
for any amount 
charged in 
relation to the 
total cost of 
credit of the 
loan 
(37.31(2)(b); if 
there’s a 
rollover, 
debtor is not 
liable for any 
amounts 
relating to cost 
of credit for 
Registrar 
can make 
lenders 
reimburse 
borrowers 
for any 
expenses to 
which 
lenders 
aren’t 
entitled 
(12A); If 
the loan 
agreement 
says that 
borrower 
must repay 
more than 
maximum, 
borrower 
only has to 
repay 
principal 
Registrar has the 
ability to refuse 
licenses, prohibit the 
use of certain 
practices, demand 
administer-ative fines 
that cannot go over 
$10,000. (s. 59, PLA) 
 
The Director can 
make orders freezing 
money or assets of 
person involved in 
proceedings that 
infringe upon the 
PLA. (s.52, PLA). 
 
With regards to false 
advertising: the 
Director can also 
order a cessation 
and/or mandatory 
publication of a 
If the lender 
violates the 
cap, must 
return to 
borrower all 
consideratio
n given to 
pay for cost 
of credit in 
loan (s. 11); 
if lender 
takes fees 
for rollover, 
must refund 
any amount 
charged 
there (s. 16) 
NA Lender must 
refund all 
loan charges 
above the 
maximum set 
by regulation 
(s. 24) 
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pre-existing 
loan (s. 37.34) 
and not cost 
of credit 
(18P) 
correction. (s.53(1), 
PLA.) 
